The EVF Model: A Novel Framework for Understanding Gambling and, by Extension, Poker

There are several senses in which the term gambling is used. All have liabilities, problems that have muddied the waters in scientific research, generated conflicting legal decisions, compromised debates over ethical and moral issues, and have led to uneven legislation. Here, a novel framework for the term is offered, based on two continuous variables: a) the Expected Value (EV) of any arbitrary game and, b) the inherent Flexibility (F) of that game. This EVF model produces a classification system for all the enterprises that can or have been called gambling. It is one that allows for more measured decisions to be made and provides a more coherent platform on which to deliberate the many significant issues that have been raised over the years. It also permits a sensible answer to the question of the nature of games like the stock market, opening a small business, and especially, poker

Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind

A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as mind and consciousness, are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the Hard Problem (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it redirects the search for the origins of mind from complex neural structures to foundational biomechanical ones, and (c) it reformulates the long-term research focus from looking for miracle moments where a brain is suddenly capable of making a mind to discovering how complex and sophisticated cognitive, emotional and behavioral functions evolve from more primitive ones

What if all animals are sentient?

Birch develops a useful framework for determining when the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) should be invoked. He rightly notes that there is a lack of agreement among social scientists, ethicists, and legislators even about whether the precautionary principle is useful, let alone when and how it should be implemented. His proposal is to establish a kind of cognitive threshold, and only when an animal shows a sufficient level of sentience would the ASPP be appropriate. From the point of view of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness model (Reber, 2016), all animals are sentient. If correct, the problems Birch identifies need to be confronted from a different perspective

Resolving the hard problem and calling for a small miracle

With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently assumed. The CBC is grounded in classical principles of evolutionary biology, which it shares with allied areas of research on emotion, learning, memory and perception

To identify all the relevant factors is to explain feeling

Several additional comments on Reber (2016a) have appeared. Like those addressed in Reber (2016b), they reflect points of agreement and disagreement on various elements of my Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model. Some, however, seem to have missed key points. I\u27m willing to take some responsibility for this. Perhaps I was not clear about some of the more radical points of the model. Hopefully the case-by-case review here will help

Sentient plants? Nervous minds?

The commentaries by Calvo (2018) and Mallatt & Feinberg (2017) on my 2016 target branch out from a common conceptual node like forks in a road. Calvo criticizes me for not acknowledging that plants too are likely to be sentient and claims I have fallen into the kind of category error of which I accuse others ─ a zoocentric bias that fails to grant consciousness to flora. Mallatt & Feinberg maintain that I\u27ve gone too far in granting sentience to any species that lacks a nervous system. Calvo makes some good points but there are other issues concerning plant sentience such as metabolic cost and ethical implications. Mallatt & Feinberg take me to task for failing to provide supporting data. They are right, and a partial remedy is offered. They also imply that I have misunderstand basic principles of evolutionary biology. I think they have misunderstood my position

Understanding the Neural Bases of Implicit and Statistical Learning

© 2019 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. Both implicit learning and statistical learning focus on the ability of learners to pick up on patterns in the environment. It has been suggested that these two lines of research may be combined into a single construct of “implicit statistical learning.” However, by comparing the neural processes that give rise to implicit versus statistical learning, we may determine the extent to which these two learning paradigms do indeed describe the same core mechanisms. In this review, we describe current knowledge about neural mechanisms underlying both implicit learning and statistical learning, highlighting converging findings between these two literatures. A common thread across all paradigms is that learning is supported by interactions between the declarative and nondeclarative memory systems of the brain. We conclude by discussing several outstanding research questions and future directions for each of these two research fields. Moving forward, we suggest that the two literatures may interface by defining learning according to experimental paradigm, with “implicit learning” reserved as a specific term to denote learning without awareness, which may potentially occur across all paradigms. By continuing to align these two strands of research, we will be in a better position to characterize the neural bases of both implicit and statistical learning, ultimately improving our understanding of core mechanisms that underlie a wide variety of human cognitive abilities

The effect of substituted benzene dicarboxylic acid linkers on the optical band gap energy and magnetic coupling in manganese trimer metal organic frameworks

We have systematically studied a series of eight metal-organic frameworks (MOFs) in which the secondary building unit is a manganese trimer cluster, and the linkers are differently substituted benzene dicarboxylic acids (BDC). The optical band gap energy of the compounds vary from 2.62 eV to 3.57 eV, and theoretical studies find that different functional groups result in new states in the conduction band, which lie in the gap and lower the optical band gap energy. The optical absorption between the filled Mn 3d states and the ligands is weak due to minimal overlap of the states, and the measured optical band gap energy is due to transitions on the BDC linker. The Mn atoms in the MOFs have local moments of 5 mu B, and selected MOFs are found to be antiferromagnetic, with weak coupling between the cluster units, and paramagnetic above 10 K